This paper presents historical evidence on the relationship between aggregate price and financial stability. We construct an annual index of financial conditions for the United States covering 1790-1997, and estimate the effect of aggregate price shocks on the index using a dynamic ordered probit model. We find that price level shocks contributed to financial instability during 1790-1933, and that inflation rate shocks contributed to financial instability during 1980-97. Our research indicates that the size of the aggregate price shock needed to alter financial conditions substantially depends on the institutional environment, but that a monetary policy focused on price stability would be conducive to financial stability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion that central banks should act as lenders of last resort is not controversial.
How best to carry out that responsibility is, however, not widely agreed upon. One view holds that the financial system is inherently fragile, and a central bank should forego other objectives, such as preventing inflation, when financial instability threatens. An alternative view argues that by controlling inflation a central bank will in fact promote financial stability. Anna Schwartz (1988; 1995) , for example, contends that financial instability has often been caused by monetary policies that cause fluctuations in the rate of inflation. She argues that monetary policy should focus exclusively on maintaining price stability.
A few countries, e.g., Canada and New Zealand, have recently made inflation control the paramount objective of their central bank's monetary policy, and the Maastricht Treaty, which established monetary union among eleven European Community countries, specifies control of inflation as the principal objective for the European Central Bank. Most countries, however, including the United States, assign their central banks multiple objectives, such as full employment and financial stability, as well as inflation control. Implicitly, the specification of multiple objectives for monetary policy assumes tradeoffs between those goals -that a country might have to accept higher inflation, at least temporarily, to maintain financial stability, for example. This paper investigates the historical association between aggregate price and financial stability to shed light on the question of whether a commitment to price stability is likely to enhance or lessen financial stability. Specifically, we use data for the United States from 1790 to 1997 to test the hypothesis that aggregate price disturbances cause or worsen financial instability.
Unanticipated aggregate price declines might increase financial distress by leaving some borrowers with insufficient income to repay contracted nominal debt. Thus unanticipated aggregate price declines would increase insolvency and default rates. Positive aggregate price shocks, on the other hand, might cause default rates to fall below expectations, and could encourage financial expansion if borrowers and lenders are unable to distinguish changes in relative prices from changes in the aggregate price level. Financial expansion based on aggregate price misperceptions can lead to resource misallocation, however, and thereby worsen financial distress associated with subsequent unanticipated aggregate price declines.
During 1790-1933, unanticipated movements in the price level best represent price shocks, whereas the persistence of inflation since 1933 led us to examine the impact of unanticipated inflation on financial conditions during 1934-97. We use the term "aggregate price shock" to refer to unanticipated movements in either the price level or the inflation rate.
In the absence of consistent time series measures of aggregate financial conditions over a long period, we construct an annual index of financial conditions from both quantitative and narrative sources. We use a dynamic time series probit model to estimate the impact of aggregate price shocks on financial conditions, as reflected in the index. We also regress four series used to construct the index on aggregate price shocks to confirm that the relationship between aggregate price shocks and the index is present in its constituent series. We control for liquidity, real output growth and supply shocks, and test whether relationships changed with changes in monetary or financial regime. Our objective is to shed light on the extent that aggregate price disturbances exacerbate financial instability, and whether the relationship between such disturbances and financial conditions is affected by the institutional environment.
We begin by outlining why aggregate price shocks might cause or worsen financial instability. We then discuss how one might identify the impact of price or inflation disturbances on financial conditions empirically, and describe the construction of an annual index of financial conditions. Next, we describe the dynamic time series probit model used in the estimation and present empirical estimates of the impact of price level and inflation shocks on financial variability, as reflected in the index. We conclude by summarizing and discussing implications of our findings.
II. AGGREGATE PRICE SHOCKS AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY
Financial instability can have either monetary or non-monetary causes and may be solely domestic or spread among countries. In the United States, the 19 th and early 20 th centuries were punctuated by banking panics -episodes of widespread panic among depositors leading to bank runs. Banking panics were a principal cause of monetary contraction, deflation, and declines in real economic activity (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) .
Whereas the impact of banking panics on the price level and economic activity is well understood, a falling price level (or inflation rate) also can be a source of financial distress.
Because debt contracts typically are written in nominal, fixed rate terms, a decline in the price level increases the real cost of servicing outstanding debt. In the presence of positive recontracting costs, loan defaults and bankruptcies increase which, in turn, puts pressure on lenders. Even a decline in the rate of inflation can cause distress if the decline is unexpected and not hedged, because some borrowers will have insufficient revenue to service debt that could have been repaid in the absence of disinflation.
Fisher (1932, 1933) was among the first to describe the impact of a falling price level on financial conditions in a business cycle framework. According to Fisher, business cycle upturns are triggered by exogenous factors that provide new profit opportunities. Rising prices and profits encourage more investment and also speculation for capital gains. Debt finance through bank loans increases deposits and the money supply, and raises the price level. A general optimism or euphoria takes hold, which increases monetary velocity and further fuels the expansion, while rising prices encourage further borrowing by reducing the real value of outstanding debt.
The process continues until a general state of "overindebtedness" is reached, that is, the point at which individuals, firms, and banks generate insufficient cash flow to service their liabilities. Any shortfall in the price level from its expected value, regardless of cause, will then leave borrowers unable to service their debts and lead to distress selling. As loans are extinguished, bank deposits and the money supply decline, further lowering the price level.
Deflation increases the real burden of remaining debt, leading to further bankruptcies and declining economic activity -a process referred to as "debt-deflation." The process continues until either widespread bankruptcy has eliminated the overindebtedness or a reflationary monetary policy has been adopted. Once recovery begins, however, the whole process will repeat itself. Schwartz (1988 Schwartz ( , 1995 Schwartz ( , 1997 (1972, 1973 Similarly, high bank failure rates are less likely in systems dominated by large, branching banks, than in unit banking systems. Nevertheless, regardless of the institutional environment, aggregate price instability can still increase borrower defaults, and thereby reduce banking system profits.
Similarly, the contribution of aggregate price stability to stability of the financial system depends neither on the cause of specific price level movements nor on the nature of the monetary regime, except insofar as they affect the extent that changes in aggregate prices are anticipated.
1 In addition to causing mistakes that increase default rates, uncertainty about future inflation can add to the cost of finance because lenders may require an inflation risk premium on interest rates that would not exist in the absence of inflation uncertainty. 2 Although Schwartz emphasizes how inflation increases the difficulty of projecting real returns for both borrowers and lenders, variability in the price level, according to Schwartz (1988, p. 49) , can also worsen problems associated with asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders because "fraud and mismanagement are more likely to gain ground in conditions of price variability, and institutions of unimpeachable standards of risk management may make judgments that later turn out to be mistaken, if not disastrous."
For example, an abrupt decline in inflation following a sustained price level increase will likely contribute to financial distress regardless of whether a country has a gold standard or a fiat monetary system. by increasing insolvency and default rates above "normal" levels. Positive aggregate price shocks, on the other hand, will temporarily reduce insolvency and default rates.
The nature of aggregate price disturbances depends on whether the monetary regime is based on a commodity (such as gold) or a fiat regime. Under the gold and bimetallic standards, the U.S. price level had a persistent stochastic trend because real shocks to the demand or supply of gold and silver caused changes in the money stock and, over the long-term, the price level (Bordo and Schwartz, 1999) . Before 1933, therefore, we identify aggregate price shocks in terms of the price level.
Inflation has become increasingly persistent since the establishment of the Federal
Reserve System in 1914 (Barsky, 1987) . This period has witnessed the decline and eventual abandonment of the gold standard in favor of a government managed fiat standard. A substantial shift in regime occurred in 1933 with suspension of the gold standard (Calomiris and Wheelock, 1998) . Since then, the price level has risen almost continuously and aggregate price shocks are best measured in terms of unanticipated inflation.
Measuring Financial Conditions
We use a discrete-valued index to measure financial conditions, following the literature on currency crises (e.g., Eichengreen, et. al., 1996; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) . Much of the sample variance of continuous measures of financial conditions is generated by variation within the range where financial conditions might be considered normal. Because our goal is to identify variables that cause financial conditions to move from normal conditions to distress or to euphoria, we are unconcerned with explaining financial conditions within the normal range. Table 1 In addition to business and bank failure rates, we include an ex post real interest rate and an interest rate quality spread in our index. The disinflationary period of the early 1980s witnessed unusually high real interest rates and interest rate quality spreads. High real interest rates increase the burden of debt on borrowers and may increase the likelihood of loan defaults.
Increases in observed real interest rates during disinflationary periods may reflect expectations that disinflation is only temporary. After some 15 years of rising inflation before 1980, it might have been reasonable to expect that inflation would also be high during the 1980s -that is, to doubt the credibility of the Federal Reserve's pledge to reduce inflation. Hence, lenders demanded high nominal interest rates to compensate for expected inflation, and (some) borrowers were willing to pay those rates, such that equilibrium nominal rates were high relative to current inflation. Because inflation did come down, and stayed down, ex post real interest rates were high, and consequently default rates were unusually high. If observed high real rates reflected similar expectational errors in other periods, we would expect the real rate to be a reasonable proxy of financial conditions.
5
The difference in yields on low and high-quality bonds is another possible measure of financial conditions. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and Mishkin (1991) found that quality spreads historically have reflected financial turbulence. More recently, in the unsettled period following the Russian government's debt default and devaluation in August 1998, spreads between yields on corporate bonds, especially those issued by low-rated firms, and U.S. Treasury securities increased sharply. This was widely interpreted as reflecting a flight to quality in the wake of increased uncertainty about foreign economies generally, and ultimately about the continued strength of the U.S. economic expansion. Quality spreads tend to increase during recessions, reflecting the higher default rates of firms during business cycle downturns.
Similarly, by redistributing wealth from debtors to creditors, unexpected deflation (or quality spread. 5 The observed real rate is simply the nominal interest rate minus the current inflation rate, so a negative correlation between the measured real rate and inflation is not surprising. The nominal interest rate does not adjust fully to changes in the inflation rate simply because some changes are unanticipated or, especially before 1933, because of mean reversion in the inflation rate. Hence, we would be quite surprised not to find a highly negative coefficient on price or inflation shocks in a regression of the real interest rate. disinflation) reduces the net worth of borrowers and thereby causes markets to demand higher yields on risky debt than on low-risk securities. 6 We aggregate the four series on business failures, banking conditions, the real interest rate and the quality spread to produce our index for 1870-1997 as follows: For each series, we computed the differences between annual observations and the series median for the subperiod, divided by the subperiod standard deviation. These standardized differences were summed across the four series for each year. We classify years in which the summed differences exceed +/−1.5 standard deviations from the overall mean as years of "euphoria" ("severe distress"); we classify years in which the summed differences are between +/−0.75 and +/−1.5 standard deviations from the mean as years of "moderate" expansion (distress); and we classify years in which the summed differences fall between −0.75 and +0.75 standard deviations from the mean as "normal."
In constructing the index, we treated the two periods, 1870-1933 and 1934-97 entirely separately. Observations in one period have no influence on the classification of years in the other period and, thus, one cannot directly compare index classifications in one period with those in the other. In estimating the probit model, we estimate separate coefficients for each independent variable in each subperiod. Hence, consistency in the index between the subperiods is not important. Appendix A presents additional detail on the construction of the index.
Index for 1790-1869
Except for short periods, continuous, consistent time series data on bank and business conditions for the period of U.S. history before 1870 are unavailable. Thus, to extend the analysis before 1870, we have constructed an index of financial conditions from narrative sources, principally Thorp (1926) , who prepared annual summaries of economic and financial conditions for several countries. By comparing Thorp's descriptions of financial conditions across years, supplemented by other historical accounts, such as Smith and Cole (1935) , we place each year into one of five categories of financial conditions.
For example, 1797 is the first year we assign to the "severe distress" category. Thorp describes the year as one of "depression; panic; … falling prices; many failures, foreign trade restricted. Money tight; little speculation; financial panic, autumn" (p. 114). For 1798, which we classify as a year of "moderate distress," Thorp writes: "Continued depression in the North with failures; … prosperity in the South; collapse of land speculation … money very tight" (p. 114).
For 1799, which we classify as "normal," Thorp writes: "Revival. Marked improvement in Northern activity; continued prosperity, South … money eases somewhat" (p. 114).
We classify 1824 as a year of "financial euphoria." Thorp describes this year as one of "prosperity; widespread activity; excited speculation … bank mania; many new banks chartered … money easy" (p. 119). For 1850, a year we classify as one of "moderate" financial expansion,
Thorp writes: "money easy; revival of stock market … influx of gold from California" (p. 125).
By contrast, for 1855 Thorp writes: "money eases, but tightens, autumn; railroad securities reach low point and recover somewhat." We classify the year as "normal."
We also classify 1853 as "normal." For that year, Thorp writes: "continued activity and expansion, slackening last quarter … very active railroad construction; extensive speculation … money tightens severely; panics and distress in interior cities; decline in railroad stock prices" (p.
125). 1853 illustrates the difficulty of assigning some years to a single category because financial conditions can change markedly within a year.
For the antebellum era, we also relied on narrative and quantitative information provided by Smith and Cole (1935) . Smith and Cole refer to the financial distress of 1818-19 as America's "first major banking crisis," and describe how a decline in commodity prices "meant serious losses to merchants who had speculated in commodities. … Banks with extended loans to speculators were now confronted with a demand for specie … and the curtailment of bank loans made the position of the American merchant even more difficult" (p. 20). This description seems consistent with later financial crises in which sudden declines in commodity prices resulted in financial losses, especially for speculators who had bet on continued price increases, and the bankers who supported them. More severe price declines were associated with widespread bank and business failures and recessions.
Figures 1-3 plot our index against price level (inflation) shocks. Index categories are ordered from 1 ("severe distress") to 5 (financial "euphoria"), with 3 assigned to "normal" years.
We use a trend-cycle decomposition to identify aggregate price shocks in terms of the price level for 1795-1933 and inflation rate for 1934-97, as described in Appendix A.
During 1795-1869, price level shocks were large in comparison with those of later years, and the index varies considerably from year to year. Moderate or severe financial distress occurred in several years that had deflationary shocks, though deflationary shocks also occurred in a few years, e.g., 1823-24, in which our narrative sources indicate that financial conditions were strong. Moreover, a few years of moderate or severe financial distress, e.g., 1819, 1837 and 1857, were not characterized by large deflationary shocks. Our narrative sources place a great deal of emphasis on financial panics, which often occurred at the beginning of major declines in prices. Our concern here, however, is with financial distress characterized by bank and other commercial failures and losses, which tended to occur during the deflationary periods that followed panics. Most of the 1950s-70s fall into the "normal" category, whereas much of the early 1980s are classified as years of "moderate" or "severe" financial distress. The 1980s had the highest rates of bank loan charge-offs and business failures since the Great Depression, alongside unusually high real interest rates and quality spreads.
IV. MODEL AND ESTIMATION RESULTS
We gauge the impact of aggregate price shocks on U.S. financial conditions historically by estimating both a dynamic probit model in which our categorical index of financial conditions is the dependent variable, and OLS regressions for the individual series used to construct the index for 1870-1997. In estimating the impact of aggregate price shocks, we control for real output, supply side, and liquidity shocks.
Dynamic Probit Model
The dynamic ordered probit model is designed explicitly for discretely-valued time series data in which pressure for a discrete change can build over time. The dynamic ordered probit model of Eichengreen, et. al. (1985) serves as a time-series probit because it allows the continuous latent variable to move gradually toward the boundary with another category over several periods. The maximum-likelihood estimation procedure of Eichengreen et. al. (1985) Furthermore, once the latent variable has been augmented, it becomes straightforward to model any regime switching, such as conditional heteroscedasticity.
Markov regime switching
We include two forms of regime switching in the latent variable for the time-series probit. First, our model allows for heteroscedasticity by way of Markov-switching variances.
Both the explanatory variables and the data that went into the construction of the quantitative index contain outliers that should be downweighted when estimating the regression coefficients. 
Appendix B contains additional details of the regime switching and the Gibbs sampling framework as applied to the dynamic ordered probit.
Explanatory Variables
We use the unanticipated components of the price level and inflation described above to estimate the effects of aggregate price shocks on financial conditions. We control for the possible impacts of both real and liquidity shocks on financial conditions. All data are annual and, except for a lagged dependent variable, contemporaneously timed.
We control for real output fluctuations using available data on GDP. We expect that negative shocks to GDP growth increase financial distress. 7 We also include the growth rates of potential GDP and labor productivity to control for the effects of possible supply side and natural rate disturbances on the estimated relationship between aggregate price shocks and financial conditions. Gray and Spencer (1990) find that the estimated impact of price surprises on real activity is sensitive to the inclusion of such disturbances in their empirical model. The same might be true for financial conditions. For example, a negative productivity shock might generate both a positive price shock and an increase in financial distress which, unless controlled for, would make it appear as though a positive price surprise worsened financial distress. We test whether supply side effects are important by reporting one specification that includes potential GDP growth and productivity growth and one that does not.
Finally, we also include the growth rate of the monetary base as an independent variable.
Over time, nominal money supply shocks will affect inflation. In the short run, however, liquidity shocks might contribute to financial distress independent of their impact on the price level or inflation. We expect that declines in base growth, for example, will increase financial distress.
Dynamic Probit Model Results
As in Figures 1-3 , we assign values to the index categories listed in Table 1 , from 1 for "severe distress" to 5 for financial "euphoria." Hence, in the ordered probit model, a positive coefficient on an independent variable would indicate that an increase in the value of that variable would lower financial distress or, equivalently, encourage financial expansion or euphoria. We expect to find positive coefficients on the price level and inflation shock variables, indicating, for example, that an unanticipated decline in the price level worsens financial distress. Table 2 reports coefficient estimates and corresponding probability values for statistical significance for two specifications of the dynamic probit model. 8 To produce reliable estimates of the cut-off parameters -which provide an indication of how much the values of the independent variables must change to move from one category of financial distress to anotherwe need reasonably large numbers of observations in each category. Hence, we estimated the 7 We experimented with using NBER business cycle dates instead of GDP and found no substantive differences in our results for the effects of aggregate price shocks on financial conditions. 8 The p-values are posterior means of the 5000 values calculated at each iteration of the Gibbs sampler: one p-value per iteration. models over the entire 1795-1997 period, allowing for the coefficients on the independent variables to differ between subperiods. In addition to the parameters reported in Table 2 , each specification included individual dummy variables for major war periods.
9
We investigate whether the impact of price level shocks differed between 1792-1869 and 1870-1933 because the price level was more stable after the Civil War, and because 1870 marks the point at which our index of financial conditions is based purely on quantitative information.
10
We estimate the impact of inflation rate shocks for 1934-97, with a break at 1979/80 to test whether inflation shocks had a different impact during the recent era of financial deregulation.
Further, we include various coefficient breaks for the growth rates of GDP, potential GDP, labor productivity, and the monetary base at points where there are changes in data sources or definitions (see Appendix A).
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For 1795-1933, the results reported in Table 2 For 1795-1869, the coefficients on aggregate price shocks for the two specifications are statistically significant at 90 percent or better (p-value of 0.10 or less). For 1870-1933, the coefficient on price shocks is significant at better than 95 percent in both specifications. We also estimate a high degree of persistence in financial conditions, as reflected in a large positive and statistically significant coefficient on the lagged index. Finally, for 1795-1933, we estimate positive coefficients for the growth rates of GDP, potential GDP, labor productivity and the monetary base, though for the most part they are not statistically significant at conventional 9 The following years were treated as war (and post-war) years, and thus were assigned dummy variables: 1813-15, 1861-67, 1917-21, and 1942-49 . The inclusion of dummy variables for war years is not crucial for our results with respect to the impact of aggregate price shocks on financial conditions. See Bordo, et. al. (2000) for probit model estimates that exclude war year dummies. 10 Bordo, et. al. (2000) extend the narrative-based index forward to 1997 and find that the estimated impact of aggregate price shocks on financial conditions is not qualitatively different using narrative-based index to measure financial conditions from the results presented here. We estimate that aggregate price shocks had a larger impact on financial conditions during 1870-1933. For that period, the impact effect is 0.449 and the average distance 0.625.
Thus, on average, a negative price shock of approximately 1.4 standard deviations was required to produce immediate deterioration in financial conditions from average to moderate distress. A 0.7 standard deviation size shock would produce a similar effect in the long run.
One also can calculate the contribution of aggregate price shocks (or any independent variable) to the probability that financial conditions are in a particular state. The marginal impact of an independent variable on the probability of being in a particular state is often evaluated at the mean of the data. Here it is meaningful to calculate the marginal effect of aggregate price shocks at the boundary between the moderate distress and normal states, however, i.e., where y * = 0. At this point the probability that a random disturbance will tip financial conditions into a distress state is 0.50. Moreover, evaluating the marginal effect at y * = 0 in each subperiod, rather than at subperiod specific mean values of y * , facilitates comparison of the marginal effects across subperiods.
In our model, the probability of not being in one of the two states of financial distress is
, βσ e j where . is the normal cumulative density function and φ is its derivative.
Hence, the marginal effect of a change in X at y The partial derivative is multiplied by the standard deviation of x i to reflect the size of the shocks. Assuming the normal density for φ , the marginal impact effect is 0.04 for 1795-1869 and 0.10 for 1870-1933, indicating that a one standard deviation size negative price shock increases the probability of distress from 50 to 54 percent during 1795-1869 and to 60 percent during 1870-1933. 12 12 One caveat regarding these results is that with Markov switching the actual density is not normal but a mixture of normals. The distortion from using the normal density is not large, however. 
Boundary and Markov Switching Parameter Estimates
The cut-off coefficients reported in the second panel of Table 2 provide information on the extent to which the category boundaries around the "normal" financial conditions category are symmetrical. We look for symmetry by comparing the distance between the upper bound of the "normal" category and the lower bound of the "financial euphoria" category with the distance between the lower bound of the "normal" category and the upper bound of the "severe distress"
category. That is, we ask whether shocks of a given magnitude will move financial conditions from normal to either extreme, or whether a larger shock is needed in one direction. The comparison is between 0 -c 1 and c 3 − c 2 .
For the full specification, we estimate that the moderate distress category is wider than the moderate expansion category: c 1 is greater in absolute value (0.7) than c 3 -c 2 (0.45). Hence, the magnitude of the shock required to move financial conditions from the bottom boundary of the normal range to the upper boundary of the severe distress range is greater than the magnitude of the shock needed to move financial conditions from the upper boundary of normal to the lower boundary of financial euphoria. This asymmetry could occur simply because the moderate distress region contains more observations than the moderate expansion region.
The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the transition probabilities for Markov switching.
These probabilities sum to little more than one (p+q) in both specifications, indicating that the states are not strongly serially correlated. Episodes of high volatility are not clustered in a way that make it valuable to estimate two transition probabilities instead of setting q = (1-p). In this way the latent variable for financial conditions does not act like most other financial data, where volatility clustering is prevalent.
Estimation for Individual Time Series
For additional insight into the impact of aggregate price shocks on financial conditions historically, we estimated separate regressions for each of the series used to construct the index for 1870-1997. Doing so provides an indication of whether the individual series underlying the quantitative index are themselves associated with aggregate price shocks. Table 3 reports regression estimates for 1875-1933 (1932 in the case of the bank failure rate). 13 We find support for the hypothesis that price level disturbances affect financial conditions in the behavior of the business failure rate, real interest rate and interest rate quality spread.
Unanticipated deflation, for example, increased the rate of business failures, and drove up the real interest rate and quality spread. 14 The coefficient on price level shocks is, however, not 13 We begin with 1875, rather than 1870, because of the absence of data on potential GDP and labor productivity before 1875. In addition, the bank failure rate regression ends at 1932 because the Bank Holiday, and subsequent government licensing procedures for re-opening banks, makes the computation of a bank failure rate for 1933 on a basis that is consistent with other years impossible. 14 The quality spread regressions also include a dummy variable to account for a change in the series' measure in 1919. See Appendix A for details.
significant for the bank failure rate, which seems to have been driven more by fluctuations in the growth of real output.
15 Table 4 reports similar regressions for 1934-97. Again we estimate a statistically significant impact of aggregate price shocks on the business failure rate and real interest rate. As before 1933, a negative aggregate price shock increased the business failure rate and real interest rate. In contrast with 1875-1933, we estimate a positive impact of aggregate price shocks on the interest rate quality spread during 1934-97. Similar to the earlier period, however, we find that banking conditions were affected more by the growth of real output than by aggregate price disturbances. These results suggest the need for further research to investigate the specific channels by which macroeconomic shocks and environmental changes interacted to increase financial stresses.
Despite the influence of regulation and other institutional factors at various times, however, our results indicate that a monetary regime that produces aggregate price stability will, as a byproduct, tend to promote stability of the financial system.
Appendix A, continued

Construction of Index of Financial Conditions for 1870-1997
The index is derived from four series for each of two subperiods. For 1870-1933, these series are the bank failure rate (except for 1933), the business failure rate, the real interest rate and the quality spread. For 1934 For -1997 , the series are the bank loan charge-off rate, the business failure rate, the real interest rate and the quality spread.
For each variable in each subperiod, we compute the distances between each observation and the subperiod median for that variable. We measure distances from the median, rather than mean, because the distributions of the variables tend to be skewed. Because of skewness, we also evaluate the distances for observations that are below the median separately from those above the median. Distances for those observations that are below the median are divided by the standard deviation of a series consisting of all observations below the median and an equal number of generated observations of equal distances above the median. Similarly, distances for observations that are above the median are divided by the standard deviation of a series consisting of all observations above the median and an equal number of generated observations of equal distance below the median. The generated observations are then discarded, leaving a series of observations for each variable consisting of standardized distances from the median.
For each year, we compute a simple unweighted average (Z t ) of these standardized distances across the four variables. Next, we compute an overall subperiod mean and standard deviation of these average distances. Following the approach of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , we assign Z t larger than 1.5 standard deviations above the subperiod mean to the "severe distress" category; Z t larger than 0.75 standard deviations above the subperiod mean to the "moderate distress" category; Z t falling between +/− 0.75 standard deviations of the mean to the "normal" category; Z t between -0.75 and -1.5 standard deviations of the mean to the "moderate expansion" category; and Zt below -1.5 standard deviations of the mean to the "euphoria" category.
Expected/Unexpected Aggregate Price Decomposition
We use a trend/cycle decomposition of inflation as the basis for our calculation of the inflation/price level explanatory variables. At each step, a value of ς is drawn from its conditional distribution. As discussed in Albert and Chib (1993) , all of the necessary conditional distributions can be standard statistical distributions, given appropriate choices for prior distributions.
We ran the Gibbs sampler a total of 8000 iterations for each model specification. We discarded the first 3000 iterations to allow the sampler to converge to the posterior distribution.
For this application, parameters and latent data are sampled in the following groups: ς ς ςβ ρ ς 
Gibbs sampling distributions
We drew the Markov switching parameters in accordance with the procedures of Dueker (1999) . In all cases the Markov state variables, S1 and S2, were treated symmetrically, so in the following description we drop references to a particular state variable.
The likelihood function for a discrete binary random variable governed by a first-order Markov process is The prior is to assign parameters u ij , where the ratio between u 00 and u 01 , for example, represents a prior guess for the ratio between the corresponding numbers of actual transitions, nn 00 01 / . The magnitudes of the u ij relative to the sample size indicate the strength of the prior.
As a weak prior, we set uuu 00 01 10 411 === ,,, and u 11 4 = , such that the sum of the u ij is low relative to the sample size.
The beta distribution is conjugate to itself, so the posterior is also beta and is the product of the prior and the likelihood of the observed transitions, so that we may draw transition 
Priors and posteriors for Markov state variables
We wish to sample the states in reverse order from the following probability, where T stands for the entire history of the observed and latent data and υ t is the observed and latent data at a point in time: We then draw y t * as a truncated normal as described above.
Drawing Threshold coefficients
With five discrete categories for financial conditions, we need to draw four cut-off Variables: P ue = price level shock. π ue = inflation rate shock. ∆ ln GDP = log change in GDP ∆ ln Base = log change in the monetary base ∆ ln Potential GDP = log change in potential GDP ∆ ln Labor Prod. = log change in labor productivity Lagged Index = autoregressive coefficient Note: The variances are fixed at 0.10 when S1=0 and 0.50 when S1=1. Note: a P-value based on robust standard errors (Newey-West correction for autocorrelation).
Variables: P ue = price level shock ∆ ln GDP = log change in GDP ∆ ln Base = log change in the monetary base ∆ ln Potential GDP = log change in potential GDP ∆ ln Labor Prod. = log change in labor productivity Lag Dep. Var. = lagged dependent variable Lag2 Dep. Var. = second lag of dependent variable 1919 Dummy = dummy set equal to 1 in 1919 and subsequent years Note: a P-value based on robust standard errors (Newey-West correction for autocorrelation).
Variables: π ue = inflation rate shock. ∆ ln GDP = log change in GDP ∆ ln Base = log change in the monetary base ∆ ln Potential GDP = log change in potential GDP ∆ ln Labor Prod. = log change in labor productivity Lag Dep. 
